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ADDRESS
ANNUAL MEETING OF THE NATIONAL

DIOCESAN ATTORNEYS ASSOCIATION
AS THE PENDULUM SWINGS FROM
CHARITABLE IMMUNITY TO
BANKRUPTCY, BRINGING IT TO REST
WITH CHARITABLE VIABILITY*
MOST REVEREND THOMAS J. PAPROCKI

In his 1842 short story, The Pit and the Pendulum, Edgar
Allen Poe tells the tale of the torments endured by a man who is
convicted of an unspecified crime and put into a completely dark
prison, where he passes out. Upon awaking, he discovers a large,
deep pit in the middle of the room. He loses consciousness again
and wakes up strapped on his back, able to move only his head.
He soon realizes there is a large pendulum with a sharp blade
swinging back and forth above him, slowly moving down and
getting closer to cutting through his chest and killing him.
Somehow he finds a way to break free of his ropes and the
pendulum recedes to the ceiling, but the walls of his prison start
to move and close in on him, pushing him closer and closer to
falling into the pit. On the brink of falling into the pit, the
prisoner hears human voices. The walls pull back and his
rescuers save him.
Many charitable and religious institutions today feel faced
with a similar dilemma as they watch the pendulum swing from
* Keynote Address at the Annual Meeting of the National Diocesan Attorneys
Association, April 27, 2008. Substanial portions of this Address have previously
appeared in 38 ORIGINS 54 (2008).
1 Auxiliary Bishop of Chicago. J.C.D., 1991, Pontifical Gregorian University;
J.C.L., 1989, Pontifical Gregorian University; J.D., 1981, DePaul University College
of Law; S.T.L., 1979, Mary of the Lake Seminary; M.Div., 1978, Mary of the Lake
Seminary; S.T.B., 1976, Mary of the Lake Seminary; B.A., 1974, Niles College of
Loyola University.
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the former protection of charitable immunity to the full exposure
of charitable liability and even to charitable bankruptcy. They
wonder if there is any way to avoid the destruction of being sliced
by the swing of the pendulum or the doom of falling into the pit of
oblivion.
Even if not completely threatened with extinction, churches
in particular feel the burdens being placed on religious exercise
in a litigious culture. They wonder if the burdens can be lifted, if
the swing of the pendulum can be stopped and brought to rest,
and if any champions will come to save them from falling into the
pit.
Before we can discuss lifting any burdens, we must first
identify what those burdens are. We should also establish as an
empirical fact that we are indeed living in a litigious culture;
however, given the limited time available for this Address, I
would hope that we could take judicial notice of this reality!' The
context of my observations in this regard is set in relation to my
experiences as a Roman Catholic Priest for almost thirty years, a
member of the Illinois bar for twenty-six years, a canon lawyer
for the past seventeen years, an adjunct professor of law for the
past nine years, and as a Bishop of the Catholic Church for the
past five years. As a priest, a civil lawyer, and a canon lawyer, I
served as Chancellor of the Archdiocese of Chicago for eight
years, and for ten years I was the Cardinal's Delegate to the
Archdiocese's Professional Fitness Review Board, which handled
allegations of clerical sexual misconduct with minors.
I wish to note that the views expressed in this Address are
entirely my own and are not intended in any way to represent
the views of the Archbishop of Chicago, the Archdiocese of
Chicago, the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, or its
members. Moreover, my views are meant not as the final word
on this topic, but rather, as a catalyst to prompt further
discussion. Since the matters that I intend to raise involve
issues of public policy, I would hope that a wide-ranging dialogue
could address these topics intelligently and reasonably in a civil
fashion, unmarked by the acrimony that too often characterizes
the public debate of significant issues in our society.

For a detailed analysis of how litigation concerning clerical sexual misconduct
of minors has impacted the Catholic Church, see PHILIP JENKINS, PEDOPHILES AND
PRIESTS: ANATOMY OF A CONTEMPORARY CRISIS 125-38 (1996).
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To provide context for our discussion, I note a few items:
First item: As of July 30, 2007, Catholic Charities of the
Archdiocese of Chicago had to end its foster care program, which,
for almost ninety years, had been one of the largest agencies in
Illinois placing abused and neglected children with foster
families. Because of a $12 million settlement of a lawsuit
alleging negligent supervision by a few abusive foster parents,
our Catholic social service agency in Chicago can no longer get
insurance for its foster care program.2
Second item: Last year, the Wisconsin Supreme Court ruled
that a man severely injured in a 2002 auto accident will be able
to collect more than $23 million from the Archdiocese of
Milwaukee and its insurer.3 What is most troubling about this
judgment is that the driver of the car was not an employee of the
Archdiocese or the church in any way, but was a volunteer with a
Catholic organization called the Legion of Mary, which was not
directly affiliated with the Archdiocese or the parish. An activity
of the Legion of Mary is the delivery of statues of the Virgin Mary
that have been blessed by a parish priest to parishioners who
request them. At the time of the accident, the driver was in the
process of delivering a statue to a family that had requested one.
She was driving her own car.4 The driver's only ostensible
connection to the Archdiocese was that the Legion of Mary was
Catholic in nature and a parish priest blessed the statue. This
case raises serious and pressing questions not only about the
proportionality of the judgment but also about agency and the
supervision of a volunteer who is not in any way under the
effective direction or control of the Archdiocese.
Third item: A 2004 research study commissioned by the
United States Conference of Catholic Bishops and conducted by
the John Jay College of Criminal Justice, entitled The Nature
and Scope of the Problem of Sexual Abuse of Minors by Catholic
Priests and Deacons in the United States, reported that the
2Ofelia Casillas & Manya A. Brachear, Catholic Charities Dropping Foster
Care: Insurance Coverage Lost After Settlement, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 17, 2007, at C 1.
3 Heikkinen v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 739 N.W.2d 489, 489 (Wis. 2007), affg
Heikkinen v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 724 N.W.2d 243, 258-59 (Wis. Ct. App.
2006).
4 Marie Rohde, Church Crash Verdict Upheld: Archdiocese's Insurer To Pay

More than $23 Million, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Oct. 13, 2007, at Al. The jury

award was for $16.8 million, but that figure rose to $23 million with interest. Id.
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amount of money paid by the Church, as a result of allegations,
to victims, for the treatment of priests and victims, and for legal
expenses was $472 million.5 Other sources have estimated the
total costs to be more than twice that.6 The claims continue.
The Archdiocese of Boston paid $85 million in 2003 to settle
552 claims.7 The Diocese of Covington, Kentucky, agreed in 2005
to pay up to $120 million to settle a class action suit filed on
behalf of all persons, known and unknown, who were sexually
abused by priests or employe.es of the diocese over the past fifty
years.8
Some of the largest payouts have come in California due to
the temporary lifting of the statute of limitations for a one-year
period in 2002. "In California, the Diocese of Orange paid $100
million for 90 abuse claims in 2004 and the Diocese of Oakland
paid $56 million to 56 people in 2005." 9 In 2006, the Archdiocese
of Los Angeles settled 45 cases of clergy sexual abuse for $60
million.10
Last year, in July, Cardinal Roger Mahony,
Archbishop of Los Angeles, announced a record $660 million
settlement with another 508 victims of sexual abuse."
In
September of 2007, the Roman Catholic Dioceses of San Diego
and San Bernardino agreed to a settlement that would pay
nearly $200 million to 144 people.' 2 The amounts are staggering;
the ramifications of these payouts will continue to unfold for
some time. As a result of various lawsuits and claims of
creditors, five Catholic dioceses-in Tucson, Arizona; Portland,
Oregon; Spokane, Washington; Davenport, Iowa; and San Diego,

5 UNITED

STATES CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, The Nature and Scope of

the Problem of Sexual Abuse of Minors by Catholic Priestsand Deacons in the United
States 8 (2004), available at http://www.usccb.orgtnrb/johnjaystudy.
6 See Adam Liptak, Scandals in the Church: The Liability: U.S. Laws Pose Risk
of Steep Penalties,N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 2002, at A20.
On File, 33 ORIGINS 242, 242 (2003).
1 Covington Diocese Settles Class Action Abuse Suit, 35 ORIGINS 81, 81-82
(2005).
1 Laurie Goodstein, Deal Reported in Abuse Cases in Los Angeles, N.Y. TIMES,
July 15, 2007, at Al.
10 On File, 36 ORIGINS 436, 436 (2006).
1 Laurie Goodstein, After Abuse Settlement, An Apology to Victims, N.Y. TIMES,
July 16, 2007, at A9.
12 Randal C. Archibold, San Diego Diocese Settles Lawsuit for $200 Million, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 8, 2007, at A8.
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California-in recent years have filed for bankruptcy protection
under chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code.13
It is without question that the sexual abuse of minors is a sin
that must be addressed by the Church and a crime that must be
punished by both the Church and the criminal justice system. It
is particularly despicable and horrendous when such abuse is
perpetrated by a person of trust, such as a priest. As the late
Pope John Paul II said to American Cardinals and Bishops in
2002, "The abuse which has caused this crisis is by every
standard wrong and rightly considered a crime by society; it is
also an appalling sin in the eyes of God.... People need to know
that there is no place in the priesthood and religious life for those
who would harm the young."14
Regrettably, the individual priests who committed acts of
abuse were not the only ones at fault for the crisis. Indeed, in his
address to the bishops of the United States during his recent
pastoral visit to our country, Pope Benedict XVI acknowledged
that in many instances cases of abuse have been "sometimes very
badly handled" by those in authority. 15 In saying this, Pope
Benedict in fact was quoting from the welcoming remarks to the
Holy Father made by the President of the United States
Conference of Catholic Bishops, His Eminence Francis Cardinal
George, Archbishop of Chicago, who said, "In our own day the
consequences of the dreadful sin of sexual abuse of minors by
some priests and of its being sometimes very badly handled by
bishops make both the personal faith of some Catholics and the
public life of the church herself more problematic." 6
In his homily the next day at the Mass in Nationals Park in
Washington, D.C., the Holy Father added:
It is in the context of this hope born of God's love and fidelity
that I acknowledge the pain which the church in America has
experienced as a result of the sexual abuse of minors. No words
of mine could describe the pain and harm inflicted by such
abuse. It is important that those who have suffered be given
1' Sandi Dolbee & Greg Moran, PriestAbuse Case Lawyers Ordered To Appear
in L.A.: Judge Likely Aims to Prevent Bankruptcy, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Feb. 22,
2007, at B1.
14 Pope John Paul II, Address to Vatican Meeting with U.S. Cardinals and
Bishops' Conference Officials, 31 ORIGINS 757, 757, 759 (2002).
"I Pope Benedict XVI, Address to U.S. Bishops, 37 ORIGINS 729, 730 (2008)
16 Francis Cardinal George, Welcome to Pope Benedict XVI, 37 ORIGINS 736, 737

(2008).
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loving pastoral attention. Nor can I adequately describe the
damage that has occurred within the community of the church.
Great efforts have already been made to deal honestly and
fairly with this tragic situation and to ensure that childrenwhom our Lord loves so deeply (cf. Mk 10:14) and who are our
greatest treasure-can grow up in a safe environment. These
efforts to protect children must continue. Yesterday I spoke
with your bishops about this. Today I encourage each of you to
do what you can to foster healing and reconciliation, and to
assist those who have been hurt. Also, I ask you to love your
17
priests and to affirm them in the excellent work that they do.
As a strictly secular matter, victims of such abuse have been
injured and need to be compensated by those responsible for the
harm. At the same time, I would suggest that the current
approach of awarding unchecked monetary damages to victims
not only is contrary to the purposes of tort liability theory, but
also places an excessive burden on the free exercise of religion for
Catholics in the United States. If the purposes of such damages
in civil cases are not only to compensate for harm, but also to
punish wrongdoers and deter wrongful conduct, the settlement or
award of civil damages is punishing the wrong people, namely,
the average parishioner or donors whose financial contributions
support the Church, but who have no role in the supervision of
clergy. Most of the bishops who might have been negligent in
their supervision of clergy who offended twenty, thirty, or even
fifty years ago are long gone. Monetary damages taken from a
not-for-profit entity do not punish the wrongdoers, but rather,
serve only to constrain the scope of the entity's charitable,
religious, and/or educational activities.
Further, unchecked
judgments threaten to diminish a charitable organization's
capability to fairly compensate victims who come forward at a
later point in time. While in some cases the claims are being
paid by insurance and the sale of undeveloped real estate, in
other places, donors' contributions are being diverted from
religious and charitable works to pay claimants and their
lawyers.
There are various reasons for lawsuits against dioceses. For
plaintiffs and their attorneys, the obvious reason is to go after
supposed "deep pockets," since lawsuits against the clergy who
17

(2008).

Pope Benedict XVI, Homily at Nationals Ballpark, 37 ORIGINS 739, 740

2009]

BRINGING THE PENDULUM TO REST

perpetrated the abuse are not likely to produce very substantial
awards or settlements. Yet, these diocesan "deep pockets" are
not as deep as some people assume or imagine. The consolidated
balance sheet for a diocese usually lists buildings such as
churches, chapels, and shrines in their assets, whose book value
could be millions or even billions of dollars. However, properties
such as houses of worship are not readily sold on the market and
do not easily convert into liquid assets. The bankruptcies
mentioned earlier also show how precarious the margin of
operation actually is for some dioceses.
Another motivation for such lawsuits is, frankly, anger at
bishops. The anger on the part of victims is understandable. But
there is also anger coming from the people in the pews over the
bishops' mishandling of these cases. Some of them see lawsuits
against dioceses as a way to punish bishops.1 8
But if one
understands the nature of a diocese, it would be apparent that a
lawsuit against a diocese does not really punish its bishop. It
punishes the Church's charitable and social outreach.
The Code of Canon Law defines a diocese as "a portion of the
people of God which is entrusted to a bishop for him to shepherd
with the cooperation of the presbyterate," that is, the priests.1 9
So a lawsuit against a diocese is really a suit against the "people
of God" and ultimately, of course, it is they who actually pay its
bills, not the bishop.
One might ask why a not-for-profit charitable institution
should be treated any differently than a for-profit entity when it
comes to corporate liability. This question can be answered on
different levels. On one level, unlike the for-profit world where,
if a for-profit company is rendered insolvent by its liabilities such
that it ceases to function, another will come along to take its
place (since nature abhors a vacuum and the dynamic of supply
and demand works to fill the void), the kinds of needs satisfied in
the case of charitable organizations are not subject to the same

18 See, e.g., TomRoeser.com: "On the Other Hand," http://tomroeser.com/section
list.asp?s=&month=11&year=2007 (Nov. 15, 2007, 04:52 EST and Nov. 20, 2007,
06:23 EST).
19 CODEX IURIS CANONICI (Canon Law Society of America trans., 1998) (1983) c.
369 [hereinafter CIC-1983].
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dynamics. As the late Pope John Paul II recognized in his social
encyclical, Centesimus Annus,
the free market is the most efficient instrument for utilizing
resources and effectively responding to needs. But this is true
only for those needs which are "solvent". . . and for those
resources which are "marketable".... But there are many
human needs which find no place on the market. It is a strict
duty of justice and truth not to allow fundamental human needs
to remain unsatisfied, and not to allow those burdened by such
needs to perish.20
Likewise, certain fundamental human needs might go
unsatisfied if liability against charitable institutions (including
the Church) is left unchecked.
At a deeper level, there is the very nature of the Church,
which is not simply another charitable institution, but whose
self-understanding is the Body of Christ. Thus, decisions about
leadership, authority, and discipline are not simple questions of
management and punishment, but must be understood in
keeping with the rights conferred by divine institution and
described in canon law, as well as in light of religious terms, such
as apostolic governance and apostolic succession from the time of
the foundation of the Church by Jesus Christ. This is where the
attempt to apply neutral principles of purely secular law to the
Church breaks down. As Father John Coughlin, Professor of Law
at Notre Dame University, has pointed out,
The state has every right to encourage shareholders in a forprofit corporation to change corporate leadership by holding the
corporation liable for negligence on the part of the corporate
executives and thus cutting into the enterprise's profits. The
application of the same liability rules loses its claim to
neutrality when state law punishes a church for making what is
essentially a religious decision and compels the church to divert
funds from its charitable and educational purposes to
compensate victims. 21
Put another way, the Church has a constitutional right to
engage in charitable activities (or more correctly, the corporal
works of mercy), because they are constitutive of her very
JOHN PAUL II, ENCYCLICAL LETTER CENTESIMUSANNUS

34 (1991).
John J. Coughlin, Canon Law and ConstitutionalLaw: The FirstAmendment,
Anthropology, Separation, and Neutrality 50-51 (Notre Dame Law Sch., Legal
Studies Research Paper No. 07-24, 2007), http//ssrn.com/abstract=975838.
20
21
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mission.22 As the Synod of Catholic Bishops said in 1971:
"Action on behalf of justice and participation in the
transformation of the world fully appear to us as a constitutive
dimension of the preaching of the Gospel, or, in other words, of
the Church's mission for the redemption of the human race and
its liberation from every oppressive situation. "2"
The same simply cannot be said of a for-profit corporation,
the primary purpose of which is necessarily to provide monetary
return on shareholder investment. Strictly speaking, there is no
constitutional right to engage in a particular field of commerce,
no matter how socially beneficial it may prove to be. The right to
freely engage in religious practice, by contrast, is one of our most
cherished rights, a right that the Framers placed above the
political fray of everyday politics. Here, "religious practice" must
mean more than the right to conduct worship services as one
pleases. It must go beyond this purely privatized understanding
of religion that some would wrongfully impose on our
constitutional order.
Federal Judge Patrick J. Schiltz of the United States District
Court for the District of Minnesota, formerly Associate Dean and
St. Thomas More Chair in Law at the University of St. Thomas
School of Law in Minneapolis, presented a paper at a symposium
held on April 4, 2003 at the Boston College Law School entitled,
The Impact of Clergy Sexual Misconduct Litigation on Religious
Liberty. Judge Schiltz identified and discussed the costs "to
those who belong to churches and to those who are served by
churches" when litigation is used "to bring about compensation
for victims of clergy sexual misconduct."2 4 These costs include
loss of monetary resources a church would otherwise use for
religious, charitable, or educational purposes; the possibility of a
ministry not representative of the people it serves; decreased
positive interactions between pastors and their congregants; a
changed relationship between bishop and pastor in which the
bishop is no longer a confidant; changes in the structure of the
church's hierarchy; and finally, a decreased ability for churches
22 Synod of Bishops, Justice in the World (Convenientes ex Universo) (Nov. 30,
1971), in 2 THE VATICAN COLLECTION, VATICAN COUNCIL II 695, 696 (Austin
Flannery ed., 1982).
23 Id.
24 Patrick J. Schiltz, The Impact of Clergy Sexual Misconduct Litigation on
Religious Liberty, 44 B.C. L. REV. 949, 949 (2003).
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to participate in public life.25 He "contends that using litigation
to compensate victims of clergy sexual misconduct poses a threat
to religious freedom."2 6 Specifically, he describes the impact of
litigation in connection with clergy sexual misconduct on
religious liberty in terms of its monetary impact, the impact on
the character of the ordained ministry, the impact on the bishop's
and pastor's relationships with congregants, the impact on the
relationship between bishop and pastor, the impact on the
relationship between the broader Church and congregations, and
the impact on the character of organized religion.27 He concludes
by "recommending that churches devise a means of fairly
compensating victims with as little harm to religious liberty as
possible."28
Years ago, the charitable and religious purposes of not-forprofit organizations were protected by the common law notion of
"charitable immunity." This concept recognized that charitable
institutions receive donations to be held in trust and to be used
for charitable purposes. The doctrine of charitable immunity
essentially provides that an individual or an organization
"engaged in a charitable, educational, religious or benevolent
enterprise or activity is ...for that reason immune from tort
liability."29
As an overview, the doctrine of charitable immunity
originated in England in the mid-nineteenth century and was
first adopted in the United States in 1876. Thereafter, charitable
immunity was adopted in most states. The immunity has
assumed various forms, based in large part on the theory
employed by the particular state to justify the immunity. Thus,
the doctrine of charitable immunity has served as an umbrella
under which states have employed various methods of limiting
the tort liability of charitable organizations. By the middle to
late twentieth century, the immunity had been modified or
25 See generally id. at 962-76.
26 Id. at 949.
27 See generally id. at 962-76.

Id. at 949.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895E & cmts. b-c (1979). Although
the Restatement does not recognize charitable immunity, section 895E provides a
good description of the types of endeavors covered by the immunity in its various
21

29

incarnations. See id.; see also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 766 (8th ed. 2004) (defining

"charitable immunity" as "[tihe immunity of a charitable organization from tort
liability").
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limited in many jurisdictions, resulting in widespread abrogation
during the latter half of the twentieth century. It appears that
only fourteen states have retained any significant form of the
immunity. °
The doctrine of charitable immunity is generally recognized
to have its origin in England in 1846, in Heriot'sHospital Feoffees
v. Ross.3
In that case, a wealthy individual bequeathed his
estate to a trust to fund a hospital for orphans.2 The defendant
trustees of the hospital denied the plaintiff orphan admission to
the hospital even though he met the trust's criteria for
admittance. 33 The plaintiff sued the trustees, seeking admittance
to the hospital and damages on grounds that the trustees had
breached the trust. 34 Ruling for the trustees, the court held that
the plaintiff could not recover from the hospital's charitable trust
funds, because allowing a charity's funds to be used to pay tort
claims diverted such funds from the purpose for which they were
intended by the donor. 5
Charitable immunity was adopted thirty years later in
America in McDonald v. Massachusetts General Hospital.6 In
that case, a student doctor working for the defendant charitable
hospital improperly set the fractured bone of the plaintiff
patient.3 7 The plaintiff sued the hospital, claiming that the
hospital was vicariously liable for the student doctor's
negligence.
Ruling in favor of the hospital, the court held that
because the hospital was a public charity-and because the
trustees did not fail to exercise due care in selecting the student
doctor or in the administration of the hospital-the plaintiff
could not recover from the hospital in tort for the negligent acts
of its servant.3 9

30 Douglas C. Murray, Charitable Immunity in Illinois: A Suggested Moderate
Legislative Approach to Limiting Tort Liability of Religious Organizations 2 (2005)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with Loyola University Chicago School of Law).
31 8 Eng. Rep. 1508 (H.L. 1846), overruled by Mersey Docks & Harbour Bd. Trs.
v. Gibbs, 1 H.L. 93 (1866); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895E cmt. b.
32 Heriot'sHosp. Feoffees, 8 Eng. Rep. at 1508.
33 Id.
34 Id.
35 Id. at 1510, 1512-13.
36 120 Mass. 432, 432 (1876).
17

Id. at 434.

Id.
39 Id. at 436.
38
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Thereafter, the immunity was recognized in most American
jurisdictions, and at one time, it prevailed in virtually every state
in which it had been considered.4 0 However, there does not
appear to have been one settled form of the immunity.
The safeguards of charitable immunity began to erode in
the middle of the twentieth century with the increasing
sophistication of medical technology and the rise of medical
malpractice claims against hospitals, most of which were not-forprofit institutions. Courts began to determine that it would be
contrary to justice and equity to use charitable immunity to deny
just compensation to victims of medical malpractice (although
since that time, some states have enacted controls and limits to
those awards to preserve the viability of providers of medical
services).
In 1965, charitable immunity was generally abolished in
Illinois in the case of Darlingv. Charleston Community Memorial
4 2 In that case,
Hospital.
the plaintiff patient's broken leg became
infected while he was treated at the defendant charitable
hospital.4 3 The plaintiff brought a direct suit in negligence
against the hospital claiming that the hospital failed to
(1) maintain a sufficient number of nurses, (2) hold proper
consultation with the nurses to determine symptoms, and
(3) review the physician's work.4 4 The trial court awarded a
judgment in favor of the plaintiff.45 On appeal, the hospital
contended that the judgment had to be reduced to the extent of
the hospital's liability insurance, because insurance was the
hospital's only non-trust fund asset.4 6 Ruling for the plaintiff, the
court abolished charitable immunity.4 7 In so holding, the court
reasoned that the trust fund theory of charitable immunity was
logically deficient, and abandonment of the immunity would not
cause bankruptcy. The court further noted that (1) it would not
40

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895E cmt. b (1979); see also Parks v.

Nw. Univ., 75 N.E. 991, 993 (Ill. 1905).
"' See President & Dirs. of Georgetown Coll. v. Hughes, 130 F.2d 810, 817 (D.C.
Cir. 1942) (noting that the rule has been debated upon and modified in different
jurisdictions, making it difficult to accurately determine what the "prevailing rule"
would be).
42 211 N.E.2d 253, 260 (Ill. 1965).
Id. at 255-56.
Id. at 256.
41 Id. at 259.
46

Id.

"' Id. at 260.
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permit charitable organizations to limit their tort liabilities
based on the amount of insurance they elected to carry, and
(2) "[w]hether or not particular assets of a charitable corporation
are subject to exemption from execution in order to satisfy a
judgment does not determine liability[;] [n]o such issue arises
until liability [is] determined.""
Five years later, in 1970, the abolishment of charitable
immunity in Illinois was applied to a religious organization in
Gubbe v. Catholic Diocese of Rockford.4 9 In that case, the
plaintiff student was injured in a schoolyard fight at a school
that was owned and operated by the defendant diocese.5" The
student brought a direct suit against the diocese on the grounds
that the diocese negligently maintained and controlled its
premises and, also, that the diocese provided inadequate and
improper supervision of the schoolyard.51 Though the court
ultimately ruled in favor of the diocese on the issue of liability, it
held that the abolishment of charitable immunity in Darlingwas
proper; thus, charitable immunity was not available to the
diocese.5 2
Now, nearly forty years later, during which time we have
experienced an explosion in litigation, particularly mass tort
litigation, previously unseen, and I would argue unfathomable, at
the time of Darling and Gubbe, the complete elimination of
charitable immunity threatens to inhibit or even eliminate
certain services provided by charitable institutions such as
Catholic Charities and other diocesan agencies, as indicated in
the example of foster care services mentioned at the outset. In
claims and lawsuits involving dioceses, plaintiffs' attempts to
include parish properties and parish funds in the total assets of
the diocese have left not only bishops and diocesan officials
wondering about the status of parish assets, but parishioners
themselves have begun to question the security of their donations
being used for their intended charitable and religious purposes.
The Code of Canon Law recognizes and protects against this by
declaring that parish assets are distinct from diocesan assets and
that diocesan bishops are generally prohibited from using parish
48

Id.

49 257 N.E.2d 239, 241-42 (Il. App. Ct. 1970).

o Id. at 239-40.

51 Id. at 240.
52 Id. at 242-43.
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assets for diocesan purposes. 3 But because it is not yet certain
whether American civil law will do the same,5 4 parishioners are
rightly concerned about the ultimate destination of their
donations. 5 So how did we get to this point, and what do we do
about it?
There have been roughly three phases in our culture's
handling of allegations of sexual misconduct with minors over
the past half-century or so. These three phases are not mutually
exclusive, but in each of the cited periods there is a predominant
emphasis on one approach over another. Prior to 1960, sexual
misconduct with minors was viewed primarily as a moral failure
to be dealt with spiritually, according to which penance,
absolution, and a firm purpose of amendment not to sin again
were the prescribed remedies.5 6 From 1960 to roughly 1990, the
approach was primarily therapeutic, for which treatment was the
apparent solution, after which offenders were often deemed
rehabilitated and recommended for return to ministry.
51 See CIC-1983, c. 515, § 3 (providing that parishes automatically become
public juridic persons when they are established); id. c. 1256 (stating that ownership
of goods belongs to the juridic person that has acquired them legitimately); id. c.
1263 (allowing the diocesan bishop, after hearing the diocesan finance council and
presbyteral council, to impose a moderate tax for the needs of the diocese upon
public juridic persons subject to his governance; this tax is to be proportionate to
their income).
r) See Fred J. Nafziger, Bankruptcy Defeats: What the Portland and Spokane
Cases Mean for the Catholic Church, AMERICA, Mar. 27, 2006, at 11, 11, available at
http://www.americamagazine.orgcontent/article.cfm?article id=4694 (noting that
parishes claimed their assets belonged to each individual parish, while the creditors
in bankruptcy claimed that all the assets of parishes collectively were the assets of
the diocese in which they were located); see also On File, 35 ORIGINS 672, 672 (2006)
("A U.S. bankruptcy judge in Portland, Ore., has indicated she will not permit sex
abuse plaintiffs to be paid from parish property before the issue of parish ownership
has been resolved through appeals in the courts."); On File, 36 ORIGINS 112, 112
(2006) ("Parishes in the Diocese of Spokane, Wash., are not owned by the

diocese .

. . .").

Both bankruptcies were settled without resolving the legal question of

whether parish property is considered part of the diocesan assets. See Ed Langlois &
Robert Pfohman, 1st Catholic U.S. Bankruptcy Ends with $75 Million Settlement,
CATHOLIC NEWS SERVICE, Apr. 19, 2007, available at http://www.catholic.org

national/national_story.php?id=23829.
11 Suzanne Sataline, The Backlash Against Tithing, WALL ST. J., Nov. 23, 2007,
at Wl.
" See, e.g., Michael Brennan, Child Sexual Abuse "Moral FailureRather than
Crime," IRISH EXAMINER, June 17, 2005, available at http://archives.tcm.ie/irish
examiner/2005/06/17/story41282459.asp.
"' See Mary Gail Frawley-O'Dea, Preface to PREDATORY PRIESTS, SILENCED
VICTIMS: THE SEXUAL ABUSE CRISIS AND THE CATHOLIC CHURCH xi, xii-xiii (Mary
Gail Frawley-O'Dea & Virginia Goldner eds., 2007).
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However, since 1990, the approach has been primarily legal, in
terms both of canon law and of civil law, with the imposition of
penalties on clerical perpetrators and the seeking of monetary
settlements and damages for alleged wrongs. 8 As a result of our
highly litigious culture and relatively unchecked exposure to
liability, an undue burden has been placed on our free exercise of
religion guaranteed by the First Amendment of the United States
Constitution. This burden needs to be lifted.
While a full return to the complete charitable immunity of
the past is neither likely nor desirable, the civil law of our land
needs to reflect a reasonable balance between providing equitable
remuneration for those who have been harmed by agents of
charitable and religious institutions and respecting the
charitable intent of donors whose contributions have been given
in trust to be used for charitable and religious purposes. The
unlikelihood of returning to full charitable immunity is a political
reality, but full charitable immunity is also undesirable because
reasonable liability serves legitimate public purposes of
compensation and accountability. My point is that the pendulum
has swung from the complete protection of charitable immunity
to the complete exposure of charitable liability and, in some
cases, all the way to charitable bankruptcy. My hope would be to
restore some sense of balance, which I would call preserving
charitable viability.
Charitable immunity came into existence because society felt
a need to protect the donative intent of charitable contributions
and to protect the institutions that such donations supported.
Society determined that these institutions provided services or
promoted values that fostered the common good. The doctrine
eroded because of the desire to provide just compensation for
those who have been harmed by the tortious conduct of
charitable institutions and their agents, as well as to serve as a
measure of public accountability for their wrongful or negligent
actions. Now we must ask whether we are seriously eroding the
charitable patrimony of American society that has done so much
to feed the hungry, to educate and care for children, and to
otherwise provide for the basic human needs of the poor. We
must also ask as a matter of public policy if society is prepared to
5s Cf. John J. Coughlin, The Clergy Sexual Abuse Crisis and the Spirit of Canon
Law, 44 B.C. L. REV. 977, 986-92 (2003) (noting "a general societal shift in the 1980s
from the psychological to the punitive in sexual abuse cases").

JOURNAL OF CATHOLIC LEGAL STUDIES

[Vol. 48:1

shoulder the cost of the increased demand for government to
provide such services if charitable institutions can no longer
afford to do so.
Whether intended or not, the current legal reality of
complete liability exposure is undermining the charitable works
and the religious freedom of the Church and other religious and
charitable organizations. This is an important issue. We should
not be passive, but take considered, compassionate, and
constructive steps to address it. Some of these devices to help
preserve charitable viability are under our own control, such as
forming parishes as separate not-for-profit corporations or
express trusts in order for their structures to more closely reflect
their status in canon law as separate juridic persons that are
distinct from the diocese. 9 Others may be pursued as legislation
or may be decided by the courts themselves as a natural
evolution of the doctrine of charitable immunity.
Recognizing that it is not realistic or desirable to return to
the former notion of charitable immunity, we might want to look
to reforms that have already been enacted or are under
discussion in various states that have put some limits on medical
malpractice liability. Just as those reforms seek to preserve the
provision of medical services, this revised approach might
appropriately be termed preserving charitable viability, which
seeks to strike a balance between preserving the ongoing
existence of the charitable activities for which funds were
donated, while providing reasonable compensation for those who
have been harmed by the charitable institution.
Some possible approaches to preserving charitable viability
that merit serious discussion:
"

*
*

'9 See

Lobbying the state legislatures to enact legislation
that limits tort recovery against a charitable
organization to the extent of the organization's
annual aggregate liability insurance, but that also
requires that the organization maintain a minimum
level of insurance coverage.
Mandating appropriate state regulation of insurance
coverage.
Capping compensatory damages at predetermined
levels, given that insurance may not be available.

supra note 53 and accompanying text.
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*
*
*

*

*

*
*

Eliminating punitive damages in cases involving
charitable institutions.
Placing caps on attorneys' fees when suing a
charitable institution.
Providing statutes of limitations that are consistent
in their application and meaningful, rather than
subject to questionable notions such as "recovered
memory" and ambiguous terms such as when the
harm is "discovered."
Requiring that the charitable institution have actual
knowledge of a perpetrator's previous wrongdoing in
order to be liable for any subsequent harms.
Requiring that indemnification be provided in
conjunction with government grants and contracts for
the provision of social services.
Mandating conciliation or arbitration of claims.
Providing that any damages that are awarded are
actually used to help victims and prevent future
harm, rather than intending punishment as the
primary objective of awards.

In considering these proposals, one might ask what would
distinguish "charitable institutions" that engage in various
activities such as health care from "non-charitable institutions"
that engage in the same activities. That is, under a regime of
"charitable viability" shouldn't the patient at a Catholic hospital
who has the wrong kidney removed by a negligent doctor be able
to recover as much as the patient at a for-profit hospital who
suffers from the same negligence? Should the happenstance of
which hospital he goes to dictate the amount he can recover?
What if the negligence on the part of each institution was the
same? My answer to that question is that I would treat medical
malpractice claims in a separate category, with the same limits
on liability whether the hospital is for-profit or nonprofit.
A moderate legislative approach seems the most effective
means for implementing the above suggestions, given that courts
will not likely reinstate charitable immunity where it has been
abolished. This approach seeks to balance the interest of both
tort victims and religious and charitable organizations.
Moreover, an approach that limits the liability of religious and
charitable organizations, but simultaneously ensures that funds
will be available to compensate tort victims, serves to maximize

JOURNAL OF CATHOLIC LEGAL STUDIES

[Vol. 48:1

the interests of both sides." Alternatively, without waiting for
legislatures to act, courts themselves might take the approach of
balancing the competing interests as a natural development of
previous decisions concerning charitable immunity. After all,
courts had cited the belief that the likelihood of bankruptcy was
remote even if charitable immunity were abolished, as in the case
of Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit DistrictNo. 302,61 where
the Illinois Supreme Court noted that no school districts had ever
gone completely bankrupt due to tort liability and that "[t]ort
liability is in fact a very small item in the budget of any well
organized enterprise."62 That may have been true in 1959, but as
pointed out earlier, several dioceses and other charitable
institutions have filed for bankruptcy or have had to discontinue
their charitable services as a result of lawsuits. Tort liability is
no longer a very small item in the budget, even in the best
organized enterprises.
Again, these are not fully developed
proposals, but some suggestions designed to prompt further
discussion and dialogue.
In sum, the litigious culture in which the Church is situated
in the United States has had a deleterious impact on the exercise
of religious liberty. The burdens of this adverse impact need to
be lifted and can be lifted by more strategic use of legal
mechanisms such as separate not-for-profit corporations or
express trusts. Others may be pursued as legislation or may be
decided by the courts themselves as a natural evolution of the
doctrine of charitable immunity. This revised approach might
appropriately be termed preserving charitable viability, which
seeks to strike a balance between preserving the existence of the
charitable activities for which funds were donated, while
enabling charitable organizations to provide reasonable
compensation for those who have been harmed by the agents of
charitable institutions. Such approaches could help to lift the
burdens on religious exercise in a litigious culture and bring the
pendulum to rest.

See Murray, supra note 30, at 13.
163 N.E.2d 89 (Ill. 1959), superseded by statute, 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
10/1-101 (West 2008).
612Id. at 94-95.
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